faster malicious 2pc with online/offline dual execution

Mike Rosulek @ Oregon State | SU


collaborators:
















Security against malicious adversaries





 $\operatorname{garble} \mathit{f}(\cdot, \mathit{y})$

















- Full security against malicious receiver
- Malicious sender can construct bad garbled circuit






▶ Define a **common** garbled encoding: $[\![z]\!]_{A,B} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} [\![z]\!]_A \oplus [\![z]\!]_B$






- lacksquare Define a **common** garbled encoding: $[\![z]\!]_{A,B}\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}[\![z]\!]_A\oplus [\![z]\!]_B$
- Malicious Bob learns whether g(x) = f(x, y) (only 1 bit)




- lacksquare Define a **common** garbled encoding: $[\![z]\!]_{A,B}\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}[\![z]\!]_A\oplus [\![z]\!]_B$
- Malicious Bob learns whether g(x) = f(x, y) (only 1 bit)
- ▶ Malicious Bob can't predict $[x]_{A,B}$ for for $z \neq f(x,y)$
 - ⇒ can't make Alice accept incorrect output!




Main idea:

ightharpoonup Run κ copies of Yao's protocol in each direction




Main idea:

- ightharpoonup Run κ copies of Yao's protocol in each direction
- Cut and choose: check each garbled circuit with probability 1/2.



Main idea:

- ightharpoonup Run κ copies of Yao's protocol in each direction
- Cut and choose: check each garbled circuit with probability 1/2.
- Garbled circuits in same direction have same output encoding



Main idea:

- ightharpoonup Run κ copies of Yao's protocol in each direction
- Cut and choose: check each garbled circuit with probability 1/2.
- Garbled circuits in same direction have same output encoding
- What to do when Alice gets disagreeing outputs?

reconciliation technique





lacksquare Honest parties can compute common $[\![z^*]\!]_{A,B}\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}[\![z^*]\!]_B\oplus [\![z^*]\!]_A$

reconciliation technique


$$[\![z_1]\!]_B, [\![z_2]\!]_B, \dots$$

$$S_A = \left\{[\![z_i]\!]_{A,B}\right\}_i$$



- lacksquare Honest parties can compute common $[\![z^*]\!]_{A,B}\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}[\![z^*]\!]_B\oplus [\![z^*]\!]_A$
- ▶ If disagreeing outputs, compute **set of candidates**


reconciliation technique



- lacksquare Honest parties can compute common $[\![z^*]\!]_{A,B}\stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}[\![z^*]\!]_B\oplus [\![z^*]\!]_A$
- If disagreeing outputs, compute set of candidates
- Do private set intersection on the sets!
 - \Rightarrow PSI output identifies the "correct" z_i




protocol summary



lacktriangleright κ instances of Yao in each direction, check random subset




protocol summary



- \triangleright κ instances of Yao in each direction, check random subset
- Compute set of reconciliation values




protocol summary





- \triangleright κ instances of Yao in each direction, check random subset
- Compute set of reconciliation values
- Private set intersection to identify correct output




protocol analysis








▶ Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[z^*]_{A,B}$




- ▶ Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[z^*]_{A,B}$
- ▶ One of Bob's garbled circuits correct ⇒






- ▶ Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[z^*]_{A,B}$
- ▶ One of Bob's garbled circuits correct ⇒ PSI output leaks nothing!





- ▶ Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[z^*]_{A,B}$
- ▶ One of Bob's garbled circuits correct ⇒ PSI output leaks nothing!
- None of Bob's garbled circuits correct ⇒





- ▶ Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[z^*]_{A,B}$
- One of Bob's garbled circuits correct ⇒ PSI output leaks nothing!
- ▶ None of Bob's garbled circuits correct \Rightarrow PSI output leaks just 1 bit



"dual-ex+PSI" summary

 κ garbled circuits in each direction (can be done simultaneously)

Adversary cannot violate output correctness

Adversary learns a single bit with probability $1/2^{\kappa}$; only when:

- All opened circuits are correct
- All evaluated circuits are incorrect

rest of the talk

Online/offline, multi-execution setting

Reducing # of garbled circuits

Adapting "dual-execution+PSI" protocol to online/offline setting: [RindalR16]

- Ensuring input consistency
- Lightweight private set intersection

Implementation, performance

Comparison to [LindellRiva15] and info-theoretic protocols

online/offline setting

Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]

Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]



generate a lot of garbled circuits

Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?


[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]



open and check some fraction of them


Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]




Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[HuangKatzKolesnikovKumaresanMalozemoff14,LindellRiva14]




Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]



Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]



Want to do 2PC of same circuit N times?

[Huang Katz Kolesnikov Kumaresan Malozemoff 14, Lindell Riva 14]




- for security $1/2^{\kappa}$, need $O(\kappa/\log N)$ circuits per execution
- example: N = 1024, $\kappa = 40 \implies$ 4 circuits per execution



offline phase online phase








offline phase ----online phase









offline phase online phase










challenge #1: input consistency

How to ensure same inputs in Alice/Bob circuits?

[KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15,shelatShen13] technique incompatible with offline circuit garbling


pre-computing OTs [Beaver95]

[for simplicity: 1 input bit from Alice]




pre-computing OTs [Beaver95]







pre-computing OTs [Beaver95]






















√ 🗇









Can check consistency of commitments in cut-and-choose:

- ightharpoonup Alice can show k_r to prove what r she got from OT
- ⇒ at least one pair of A/B circuits with consistency



input consistency

Within each bucket,

- Alice uses same input x on all Bob-circuits (easy)
- ightharpoonup At least one Alice-circuit where Alice uses x (except prob $1/2^{\kappa}$)


Suffices for security!

Zero online cost for input consistency!

challenge #2: psi

How to efficiently instantiate PSI?


closer look at PSI



Bob's only "useful" PSI input is $[\![z^*]\!]_{A,B}$




closer look at PSI



▶ Simulator knows $[z^*]_{A,B}$; rest of S_A independent of Adv's view



closer look at PSI



- Simulator knows $[z^*]_{A,B}$; rest of S_A independent of Adv's view
- \star Simulator **does not need to extract** Adv's input S_B !
 - \ldots it suffices to check whether $[\![z^*]\!]_{A,B} \in \mathcal{S}_{B}$



instantiating psi

[KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15]:

Suggest using fully malicious PSI subprotocol


[RindalR16]:

- PSI protocol with "non-extracting security" suffices
- Implementation uses semi-honest PSI protocol of [PinkasSchneiderZohner14]
- Very cheap, based on pre-processed OTs (no public-key operations)

comparison to [LindellRiva15]

[LindellRiva14/15]: online/offline, malicious security, based on "traditional cut and choose" [Lindell13]:








Two phases:

1. B circuits computing f(x, y)

comparison to [LindellRiva15]

[LindellRiva14/15]: online/offline, malicious security, based on "traditional cut and choose" [Lindell13]:




Two phases:


- 1. B circuits computing f(x, y)
- 2. ~ 3 B circuits computing: "if Bob can prove Alice cheated in phase 1, then reveal x to Bob"

protocol comparison

[KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15,RindalR16]:

[LindellRiva14/15]:







protocol comparison

[KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15,RindalR16]:

[LindellRiva14/15]:






 B primary circuits in each direction (evaluated simultaneously!) B primary circuits


protocol comparison

[KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15,RindalR16]:



- B primary circuits in each direction (evaluated simultaneously!)
- PSI computation scales only with B

[LindellRiva14/15]:



- ▶ *B* primary circuits
- Aux computation scales as $3{\it B} \cdot \ell_{\rm input}$

a closer look at κ

- κ_c : Computational security parameter (e.g., 128)
- κ_s : Statistical security parameter: security properties violated with probability $1/2^{\kappa_s}$ (e.g., 40)

"Traditional cut-and-choose" [LindellRiva14/15]:

- When cut-and-choose fails, adversary can completely break privacy & correctness
- \Rightarrow # of garbled circuits scales with κ_s

a closer look at κ

- κ_c : Computational security parameter (e.g., 128)
- κ_s : Statistical security parameter: security properties violated with probability $1/2^{\kappa_s}$ (e.g., 40)
- $\star \kappa_b$: Bit-leaking parameter: privacy violated by a single bit (other security maintained) with probability $1/2^{\kappa_b}$

"Traditional cut-and-choose" [LindellRiva14/15]:

- When cut-and-choose fails, adversary can completely break privacy & correctness
- \Rightarrow # of garbled circuits scales with κ_s

a closer look at κ

- κ_c : Computational security parameter (e.g., 128)
- κ_s : Statistical security parameter: security properties violated with probability $1/2^{\kappa_s}$ (e.g., 40)
- $\star \kappa_b$: Bit-leaking parameter: privacy violated by a single bit (other security maintained) with probability $1/2^{\kappa_b}$

"Traditional cut-and-choose" [LindellRiva14/15]:

- When cut-and-choose fails, adversary can completely break privacy & correctness
- \Rightarrow # of garbled circuits scales with κ_s

Dual-execution approach [KolesnikovMohasselRivaR15,RindalR16]:

- When cut-and-choose fails, adversary learns only a bit
- \Rightarrow # of garbled circuits scales with $\kappa_b \leq \kappa_s$



some parameter possibilities

```
[RindalR16] with \kappa_s = \kappa_b = 40:
```

- lacktriangle same security as [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{
 m s}=40$
- same # of garbled circuits

some parameter possibilities

```
[RindalR16] with \kappa_s = \kappa_b = 40:
```

- lacktriangle same security as [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{
 m s}=40$
- same # of garbled circuits

```
[RindalR16] with \kappa_s=40, \kappa_b=30:
```

- > same security as [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{\rm s}=40$, except slightly higher probability of leaking single bit
- fewer garbled circuits (25% savings for N = 1024, 40% for N = 512)



some parameter possibilities

[RindalR16] with
$$\kappa_s = \kappa_b = 40$$
:

- lacktriangle same security as [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{
 m s}=40$
- same # of garbled circuits

[RindalR16] with $\kappa_s=40$, $\kappa_b=30$:

- > same security as [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{\rm s}=40$, except slightly higher probability of leaking single bit
- lacktriangledown fewer garbled circuits (25% savings for $\emph{N}=1024$, 40% for $\emph{N}=512$)

[RindalR16] with $\kappa_s = 80$, $\kappa_b = 40$:

- ullet strictly stronger security than [LindellRiva] with $\kappa_{
 m s}=40$
- same # of garbled circuits (only PSI cost increases)



implementation

	[RindalR16]		[LindellRiva]		[DamgårdZakarias15]	
	offline	online	offline	online	offline	online
AES circuit	5.1ms	1.3ms	74ms	7ms	high?	6ms
SHA256 circuit	48ms	8.4ms	206ms	33ms	-	-

implementation

	[RindalR16]		[LindellRiva]		[DamgårdZakarias15]	
	offline	online	offline	online	offline	online
AES circuit	5.1ms	1.3ms	74ms	7ms	high?	6ms
SHA256 circuit	48ms	8.4ms	206ms	33ms	-	-
					'	

Amortized cost over N = 1024 executions:

- same hardware, LAN connection (Amazon c4.8xlarge = 36 core, 64GB RAM)
- same security ($\kappa_s = \kappa_b = 40$)

implementation

	[RindalR16]		[LindellRiva]		[DamgårdZakarias15]	
	offline	online	offline	online	offline	online
AES circuit	5.1ms	1.3ms	74ms	7ms	high?	6ms
SHA256 circuit	48ms	8.4ms	206ms	33ms	-	-

Amortized cost over N = 1024 executions:

- same hardware, LAN connection (Amazon c4.8xlarge = 36 core, 64GB RAM)
- same security ($\kappa_s = \kappa_b = 40$)

Maximum throughput: 0.26ms / AES block (3800+ Hz)

► [DamgårdZakarias15] reports 0.4ms



summary

Online-offline dual execution:

- Fastest 2PC with malicious security to date: 1.3ms AES
- Some protocol advantages over "classic" cut-and-choose

Future work:

summary

Online-offline dual execution:

- Fastest 2PC with malicious security to date: 1.3ms AES
- Some protocol advantages over "classic" cut-and-choose

Future work:

	garbled circ	info-theoretic
online latency	low √ √	low √
online throughput	high √	high √ √
constant rounds?	yes √	no 🗶
offline time	low √	(very) high 🗡
function-indep pre-processing?	no 🗶	yes √

summary

Online-offline dual execution:

- Fastest 2PC with malicious security to date: 1.3ms AES
- Some protocol advantages over "classic" cut-and-choose

Future work: Combine GC with info-theoretic? (at least for 2-party)

	garbled circ	info-theoretic	hybrid
online latency	low √ √	low √	low 🗸
online throughput	high √	high 🗸 🗸	high √ √
constant rounds?	yes √	no 💢	no 🗶
offline time	low √	(very) high 🗡	low √
function-indep pre-processing?	no 🗶	yes √	yes √

the end; thanks.

Richer Efficiency/Security Tradeoffs in 2PC

Vladimir Kolesnikov, Payman Mohassel, Ben Riva & Mike Rosulek ia.cr/2015/055

Faster Malicious 2-party Secure Computation with Online/Offline Dual Execution

Peter Rindal & Mike Rosulek in submission