## Rerandomizable RCCA Encryption

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CRYPTO 2007 - August 23, 2007

Thanks to Qualcomm for travel support



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#### Intro Construction UC Characterization Conclusion

## Unlinkable Blind Copying

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- Ideally, want scheme to be "non-malleable except for copying"

#### Strong tradeoff between features and non-malleability:

- Copying is allowed, in very robust sense
- Everything else is forbidden, in the strongest sense



# Formalizing the Problem

#### Rerandomizability

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## Replayable-CCA (RCCA) security [Canetti, Krawczyk, Nielsen]

Scheme is CCA secure, except it may be possible to "maul" an encryption of m into another that decrypts to same m.

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#### Question [Canetti, Krawczyk, Nielsen]

Are there rerandomizable, RCCA-secure encryption schemes?

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## Related work

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▶ Defined RCCA, posed problem.



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Defined RCCA, posed problem.

Golle, Jakobsson, Juels, Syverson [RSA'04]

- Applications of rerandomizability for anonymous schemes
- Rerandomizable, CPA-secure scheme



## Related work

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#### Golle, Jakobsson, Juels, Syverson [RSA'04]

- Applications of rerandomizability for anonymous schemes
- Rerandomizable, CPA-secure scheme

#### Gröth [TCC'04] gives two rerandomizable schemes:

- Achieves weaker variant of RCCA security
- Achieves full RCCA in generic group model



#### Our Results

First rerandomizable RCCA scheme in standard model.

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Full version (and this talk) has improved construction

http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/119



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#### Key Idea #3

"Twist first strand" (technical)

- ► Make the 2 strands of different type
- ▶ Avoid bad ways of combining the 2 strands together

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Golle et al. [RSA'04] use a double-strand idea with ElGamal.

- In their case, second strand carries public key data needed to rerandomize ElGamal.
- ► In our case, second strand carries message data needed for rerandomize Cramer-Shoup.

Double-strand idea illustrated with ElGamal [Golle et al]:

▶ Normal ElGamal encryption of m (public key is  $g^a$ ):

$$g^{x}$$
,  $m(g^{a})^{x}$  for random  $x$ 

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Rerandomize x additively

$$g^{x}(g^{y})^{s}$$
,  $mg^{ax}(g^{ay})^{s}$ , for rand  $s$   
=  $g^{x+ys}$ ,  $mg^{a(x+ys)}$ ,



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Rerandomize x additively, y multiplicatively

$$g^{x}(g^{y})^{s}$$
,  $mg^{ax}(g^{ay})^{s}$ ,  $(g^{y})^{t}$ ,  $(g^{ay})^{t}$  for rand  $s$ ,  $t$ 

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$$= g^{x+ys}$$
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Result is distributed as fresh double-strand encryption



#### Intro Construction UC Characterization Conclusion

## Double-Strands for Cramer-Shoup

We apply double-strand idea to Cramer-Shoup:

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 for random x

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 for rand  $x, y$ 

#### Possible Attack!

Can "mix-and-match" strands from 2 independent ciphertexts, if they carry the same message  $(\mu)$ .

#### Key Idea #2

"Tie strands together" with shared randomness u; give an additional encryption of u

$$(g_1^x)^u, (g_2^x)^u, mB^x, (CD^\mu)^x, (g_1^y)^u, (g_2^y)^u, B^y, (CD^\mu)^y, Enc(u)$$

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Encryption of u must be:

- ▶ malleable, to allow rerandomization of *u*
- rerandomizable, for randomness within Enc



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Double-strand "Cramer-Shoup lite" has these properties.



### Twist the First Strand

$$g_1^{xu}, g_2^{xu}, mB^x, (CD^{\mu})^x, g_1^{yu}, g_2^{yu}, B^y, (CD^{\mu})^y, Enc(u)$$

#### Possible Attack

Can rerandomize first strand multiplicatively, if plaintext is known.

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Make first strand fundamentally different, so it can only be rerandomized in the prescribed way

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Analysis uses linear-algebraic interpretation:

- ► First strand's randomness x is perturbed by fixed vector
- ▶ More components  $(g_1, ..., g_4)$  needed for linear independence.

## Security of our Scheme

#### Our scheme satisfies:

- ► RCCA security (Canetti, Krawczyk, Nielsen [CRYPTO'03])
- Perfect rerandomizability
- Several correctness properties

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#### Proof uses:

- ▶ DDH assumption in 2 groups (for CS and CS-lite)
  - Requires 3 large primes of special form (Cunningham chain)
- ▶ Linear algebra interpretation of our scheme

### Some philosophical thoughts:

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- ▶ What are the "right" security, correctness definitions?



### Some philosophical thoughts:

- Want scheme that is non-malleable except for unlinkable copying feature
- ► Can also imagine different tradeoff (e.g., non-malleable other than some homomorphic operation)
- What are the "right" security, correctness definitions?
- Details motivated by natural UC formulation...



## Universal Composition (UC)

Universal Composition (UC) framework for security definitions

- Proposed by Canetti [FOCS'01]
- Simulation-based security with arbitrary interactive environment
- "Natural" formulations of security via ideal functionalities



#### Intro Construction UC Characterization Conclusion

# Universal Composition (UC)

Universal Composition (UC) framework for security definitions

- Proposed by Canetti [FOCS'01]
- Simulation-based security with arbitrary interactive environment
- "Natural" formulations of security via ideal functionalities
- No secure protocols for most tasks (unless model is significantly weakened)!



We define a powerful new UC functionality.

- Users send private messages to each other
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#### **Theorem**

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#### **Theorem**

Any rerandomizable, RCCA-secure scheme (with our correctness properties) is a secure realization of this functionality.

- Justifies our security definitions, correctness properties
- Positive UC result in standard model.
- ► Can easily extend to add features



First rerandomizable, RCCA-secure encryption scheme under standard assumption

- ► Can make unlinkable "copies" of ciphertexts
- ► Scheme is otherwise totally non-malleable



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Natural characterization in UC framework

- Justifies choice of security definitions
- Sophisticated positive result for standard UC model



## Open Problems

### Anonymous, rerandomizable RCCA scheme?

- Adversary cannot tell which public key used to generate ciphertext
- Most interesting applications of rerandomizability also require anonymity



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#### Anonymous, rerandomizable RCCA scheme?

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- Most interesting applications of rerandomizability also require anonymity

Other tradeoffs between features and non-malleability in encryption schemes

- Features can be performed in an unlinkable way
- Scheme is non-malleable otherwise



Thanks for your attention!

fin.

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... and as the malleable operation of CS-lite:

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... and as the malleable operation of CS-lite:

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For 2 operations to coincide, must have:

- ▶ CS-lite group is subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .
- ▶ DDH in both groups (that of CS and CS-lite)

Is it an unreasonable relationship between 2 groups?



## Cunningham Chains

#### Definition

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
- $lackbox{}\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}^*_{4q+3}$  and  $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}^*_{2q+1}$  have desired relationship
- ▶ DDH believed to hold (4q + 3 and 2q + 1 are safe primes).
- ▶ Cunningham chains known to exist for  $q \sim 2^{20,000}$ .

What is adversary's advantage in RCCA experiment?

normal encryption ? normal decryption ?



Define an "alternate encryption."



#### Lemma

Alternate encryption indistinguishable from normal encryption (DDH assumption).



 $\begin{array}{c|cccc} normal & & alternate \\ encryption & & \approx \\ \\ normal & & normal \\ decryption & & decryption \\ \end{array}$ 

#### Lemma


Alternate encryption independent of choice of plaintext.



Decryption answers might leak information about private key!

normal alternate encryption  $\approx$  normal decryption decryption  $\uparrow$ 

Define a (computationally unbounded) "alternate decryption."



#### Lemma

Alternate decryption indistinguishable from normal decryption (linear algebra analysis).



#### Lemma

Alternate decryption computed using only public key and challenge ciphertext.

Adversary's entire view independent of choice of plaintext!

